By Fleischer Wolfgang
3,7-cm- Panzerjaegerkanone КНИГИ ;ВОЕННАЯ ИСТОРИЯ Издательство: Podzun-Pallas-VerlagСерия: Waffen-Arsenal 169Автор(ы): Wolfgang FleischerЯзык: GermanГод издания: 1997Количество страниц: 52ISBN: 3-7909-0619-0Формат: pdf (200 dpi) 1600x2310Размер: 37.6 mb RapidIfolder sixty eight
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Extra info for 3,7-cm- Panzerjaegerkanone
My underline)98 The role of Soviet military doctrine with regard to strategic nuclear forces was addressed as well: The available open and classiﬁed Soviet literature indicates that the Soviets are committed to improving their capabilities for waging nuclear war. This commitment reﬂects a leadership consensus on the need to assure the survival of the Soviet Union in case of such a war and a military doctrine which holds that a nuclear war could be won . . 99 34 Strategic forces The 1977 NIE reiterated these views: Soviet military doctrine sets a goal of creating war-winning capabilities and then deﬁnes this posture as the best deterrent .
S. S. 65 PD 59 was a culmination of counterforce strategy stretching back to NSDM 242. 66 In this sense, it was a reﬂection of Brzezinski’s emphasis on ethnic targeting. Brown outlined the importance of this in September 1980: Now, clearly, their industry and their population are important to them, but so are their military forces, so is their political and military control over the elements of Soviet power. We need to be able to show them—and in order to be able to show them we need to have the forces, the doctrine and the command and control that will enable us to do this—that given a nuclear war, whatever it is that the Soviet leadership counts as most important to it, would be threatened and would in an exchange or a series of exchanges be destroyed.
Furthermore, after a two-year protocol, the United States would be able to deploy cruise missiles on its B-52 bombers, which themselves represented an important addition to US counterforce capabilities. 127 Although unratiﬁed, both countries adhered to its limitations, an indication (at least in part) that it was sound regarding strategic doctrine. Conclusion The development of US nuclear strategy during the 1970s, which saw an increasing emphasis on counterforce operations and nuclear warﬁghting, was inﬂuenced by a variety of factors.