

# THE FEAR OF LOOKING

or

SCOPOPHILIC – EXHIBITIONISTIC CONFLICTS

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to S. P. A.

## Foreword

THE principles of overdetermination and multiple function are solidly established as both necessary and central to the theoretical fabric of psychoanalysis as a psychology essaying to encompass the multiplicity and the interrelatedness of the diverse determiners of human behavior in sickness and in health. A consequence of these principles, not usually specifically remarked as such, is that one can then take any single conceptual perspective or vantage point and explore how much of mental events and of the derivatives in behavior through which they are manifest can be systematically studied and illuminated from within that particular framework. And all this study can be without prejudice to other perspectives or vantage points, overlapping, at times partially congruent and at times partially not, but not at all mutually exclusive.

Such a perspective or vantage point is Doctor Allen's happy choice of the looking-showing polarity or the scopophilic-exhibitionistic impulses and conflicts, an admittedly rather narrow and one-sided focus, but one that Doctor Allen convincingly demonstrates to us to be more than expectedly fruitful—and surprisingly, hardly heretofore explored, certainly not with the kind of systematic exposition and comprehensive articulation presented to us in this volume. The thesis, and the many implications pursued and relatednesses adduced, once presented, seem almost self-evident. (1) The problems of scopophilia-exhibitionism exist in degrees in us all, in both our normal and our abnormal manifestations. (2) Looking-showing conflicts occupy an influential component role in relation to the dynamics of all neurosis—in both oedipal and pre-oedipal conflicts, in relation to the vicissitudes of both libido and aggression, and intertwined with other paired partial instincts and emotional polarities. (3) Scopophilic-exhibitionistic factors permeate and subserve our psychic formations in our pathology, in our normality, and even “beyond normality”—in our artistic and scientific creativity—for everyday life and for extraordinary people as well. (4) And technically, the nature of psychoanalytic therapy is such that conflicts over looking and showing are necessarily central to the therapeutic process and the curative intent: unanalyzed defenses against the task-appropriate deployment of impulses to look and to show can be a major technical hazard for both analysand and analyst, leading in extreme cases to analytic breakdowns.

These several and related themes are presented and interwoven for us via that solid crucible of our psychologic theory, the data of our consulting rooms, depicted by way of a baker's dozen of illustrative analytic case descriptions. That much of this same case material can also be read (perhaps equally rewardingly) without the focus on the scopophilic-exhibitionistic conflicts, in terms of more familiar straight psychosexual and psychoaggressive developmental fixations, regressions, and conflicts, only underscores the richness and the manifold explanatory power of a theory that relates a multiplicity of determiners of behavior to an equal multiplicity of available behaviors, via the principles of multiple causation and over-determination. Doctor Allen has placed the scopophilic-exhibitionistic perspective squarely amongst those organizing frameworks that it is well to bear closely in mind when attempting to unravel the technical and the conceptual problems with which our work and our theory face us: he is convincing that, without proper attention to the looking-showing polarity, analytic work and analytic thought miss a vital dimension.

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*I learnt to restrain speculative tendencies and  
to follow the unforgotten advice of my master,  
Charcot: to look at the same things again and  
again until they themselves begin to speak.*

Freud



## Introduction

A FRIEND of mine has a dog who is a joyful exhibitionist. This remarkable dog does many tricks. Among them is one in which, on command, he will lie quietly for long periods near a morsel of food which he will not eat until given a signal. Invariably the dog will avert his gaze from the tempting food during the abstinence. . . . Many times I have observed a baby turn emphatically away from looking at someone other than his nursing mother, even though the baby might happily play a game of peek-a-boo with the same person at another time. . . . Recently, driving along a mountain road, I saw a woman passenger close her eyes and with an exclamation of fear turn away from the sight of the steep drop. . . . On another road a curious, gawking crowd gathered around a pair of injured cyclists as they were given first aid while awaiting an ambulance. . . . A boy at the zoo presses close against the cobra's glass case while his mother looks nervously away. . . . A child in school stands to read aloud, blushes, stammers, and in tears sits down. . . . A father helps his son adjust his tie. . . . A pretty girl looks in the mirror and attaches a dangling earring. . . . An author puts his manuscript through the eighth draft before hazarding it to the publisher.

Have all these matters much in common? I think so. And that commonality is the subject of this monograph. My primary purpose here is to illustrate the importance of scopophilic-exhibitionistic or look-show factors in neuroses, in everyday life, and in the treatment situation. A secondary purpose is to examine some of the implications of scopophilic-exhibitionistic cathexes for creativity.

A review of the words "scopophilia" and "exhibitionism" here will clarify the uses of these words in the monograph.

*Webster's* defines "scopophilia" as a "desire to look at sexually stimulating scenes especially as a substitute for actual sexual participation that constitutes a partial or component instinct often sublimated (as in a desire for learning)" (*Webster's*, 1961). *Psychiatric dictionary*, however, more closely defines "scopophilia" as used in this monograph: "Sexual pleasure derived from contemplation or looking. It is a component-instinct and stands in the same relation to exhibitionism as sadism does to masochism" (Hinsie and Campbell, 1960).

As an added note to the definition of scopophilia, it is interesting to

read Hinsie and Campbell concerning the two spellings "scopophilia" and "scoptophilia". "In Freudian literature the German *Schaulust* has been translated as scoptophilia, but scopophilia is the more correct form" (Hinsie and Campbell, 1960, p. 668).

For "exhibitionism" Webster's as a second meaning gives "the act or practice of behaving so as to attract attention to oneself: extravagant or willfully conspicuous behavior" (Webster's, 1961). Hinsie and Campbell elucidate further: "This impulse . . . may be progressively displaced from the genital zone to the body as a whole, to the oral zone (the pleasure of speaking), to clothes, to dramatics, to the possession of material assets, etc. Or, it may be expressed in terms of reaction-formation, that is, there may be aversion to display of any kind" (Hinsie and Campbell, 1960).

In *A glossary of psychoanalytic terms and concepts* "scopophilia" and "exhibitionism" are not separately defined but are mentioned in the definition of "psychosexual development": ". . . a wish to look at (*scoptophilia*) and to have the genitals seen (*exhibitionism*)" (Moore et al., 1967).

Permission to explore new fields, Erik Erikson once remarked, is one of the functions of great men. Intellectual leaders especially, I suggest, give scopophilic permission. They give permission to look, to see, to understand the previously forbidden or unknown. This is true of Freud, as it is of Darwin, Pasteur, Euclid, and Einstein. And it is probably true of Moses, Jesus, Gandhi, and Malcolm X.

New understanding can challenge our comfortable old masteries and shake our sense of infantile omnipotence. When new ideas strain our way of life, we may recoil from learning. But once a new field is opened to observation, its detailed exploration is open to less bold and less gifted investigators. The insights of geniuses of the past often are not beyond the grasp of the average high school student of the present. The student, of course, might be incapable of making the original observation leading to the breakthrough in understanding. Sometimes new ideas must be imbibed by new generations with their mothers' milk before full comprehension is achieved.

Further investigation of look-display factors is, in a sense, long overdue. In 1905, in "Three essays on the theory of sexuality", Freud wrote that certain paired component instincts, such as scopophilia and exhibitionism and the active and passive forms for cruelty, play an "especially prominent part" in psychoneurosis (Freud, 1953a, p. 166). Despite many changes in psychoanalytic theory the concepts of scopophilia and exhibitionism remain unchanged and little exploited. The especially important part played by the paired component instincts seemed, like such concepts as the unconscious and transference, to have survived, for Freud, all of his subsequent investigations and revisions of theory. The importance of

the scopophilic-exhibitionistic factors has not been challenged by the development of ego psychology nor by the emphasis in recent years on structural theory in psychoanalysis. Because sadism and masochism are more basically related to aggression and libido and to formation of psychic structure they have been subjects of more intensive study in analysis than have the scopophilic-exhibitionistic components of neurosis and transference. Cruelty directed against the ego by the superego in the form of unconscious guilt causes suffering; and this unconscious guilt is evident in virtually every analytic case. As Freud said, the contribution made by the active and passive forms of the instinct for cruelty "is essential to the understanding of the fact that symptoms involve *suffering*, and it almost invariably dominates a part of the patient's social behavior" (p. 166).

Despite Freud's coupling of them with other paired component instincts, scopophilia and exhibitionism have been virtually bypassed in psychoanalysis. Less obvious in their manifestations than the other paired partial instincts, scopophilia and exhibitionism are nevertheless crucial as core components of neurotic conflict and of transference phenomena, especially the transference neurosis. In my opinion, scopophilic-exhibitionistic conflicts have not been adequately investigated and particularized. In this monograph I propose to examine scopophilic-exhibitionistic conflicts as pervasive neurotogenic elements meriting more intensive study and as determinants of styles of living and learning. To repeat, the primary purpose is to illustrate the importance of scopophilic-exhibitionistic factors in neuroses, in everyday life, and in the treatment situation. A secondary purpose is to examine some of the implications of scopophilic-exhibitionistic cathexes for creativity.

Perversions of voyeurism and exhibitionism are not the subject of this monograph. The concern here is with the neurotic disturbances of seeing and showing and with the fate of the scopophilic-exhibitionistic impulses within normative life styles. However, some general remarks about perversions, and especially the perversions of exhibitionism and voyeurism, are necessary to place the material of this monograph in its proper context.

The suffering of a neurotic brings him into treatment, and this is the case where the neurotic symptoms arise out of inhibitions of scopophilia and exhibitionism. But the overt or true pervert rarely seeks treatment for his perversion since it is felt by him as "natural", ego-syntonic, even if not socially acceptable. If he seeks treatment, it is usually predominantly for neurotic suffering of other kinds. The cases presented in this monograph do not represent true perversions of exhibitionism and voyeurism; that is, the exhibitionistic or voyeuristic activity had not become the exclusive sexual aim in itself nor the primary preferred mode of sexual discharge. Nevertheless, these neurotic symptoms arising out of conflicts

in the scopophilic-exhibitionistic areas can coexist not only with adult heterosexuality but also with other true perversions. In one of the cases (Case III, p. 47), an ego-syntonic, overt, homosexual perversion is accompanied by severely distressing voyeuristic-exhibitionistic neurotic symptoms.

"The less repellent of the so-called sexual perversions are very widely diffused among the whole population . . ." (Freud, 1953a, p. 51). However, technically, in a sexual perversion, reaching climactic sexual discharge involves an exclusive substitution of some goal other than genital heterosexual intercourse. Freud pointed out that the sexual goals in the perversions are the goals or aims of infantile and childhood sexuality (Freud, 1953a, p. 172). And Fenichel wrote: "Since the aims of perverse sexuality are identical with those of infantile sexuality, the possibility for every human being to become perverse under certain circumstances is rooted in the fact that he was once a child" (Fenichel, 1945, p. 325). Sexually perverse acts may occur either as a result of arrested development or as a result of regression under stress to a point of partial fixation. In the latter instance, which might be called reactive perversion, a perverse method of sexual discharge arises when the person is deprived of the opportunity of heterosexual activity.

The preferred or exclusive use of a body part such as the mouth or anus, either as a sexual object or as a zone of stimulation leading to climax, is a derivative of a phase of psychosexual development. In the perversions the sexual energies have been organized around one of the childhood rudiments of sexuality, around one of the partial instincts, in such a way that a genital discharge is still possible. In the heterosexual adult, the preferred forms of stimulation preliminary to genital intercourse—kissing, looking, fondling—are also residual derivatives of childhood sexuality. But these kinds of foreplay act as facilitators toward genital heterosexual intercourse; they are not in themselves displaced end-gratifications. In the pervert the existing impediments to sexual discharge are overcome by the perverse act.

Freud brought out the relationship between neuroses and perversions. He indicated that a neurotic symptom is in a sense the inversion of a perversion: in both the perversions and the neuroses, the conflict involves an interference with some partial instinct or element of childhood sexuality finding its place as a confluent part of adult genital heterosexuality (Freud, 1953a, pp. 165-6). Again to quote Fenichel: "The difference between neuroses and perversions lies in the fact that the symptom is 'desexualized' in the neuroses, but is a component of infantile sexuality in the perversions, and that its discharge is painful in the neuroses, but brings genital orgasm in the perversions" (Fenichel, 1945, p. 326). Thus in the neurotic symptom the infantile or perverse element

is repressed or inhibited in such a way as to cause distress or suffering in the form of anxiety, shame, or guilt. Freud also called attention to the fact that it is not rare to find perversions and neuroses occurring in the same family (Freud, 1953a, p. 236).

True genital exhibitionists are exceedingly difficult to analyze or to work with psychotherapeutically in the usual uncovering, dynamic way. They tend to be silent and observing in the psychoanalytic situation, unable to exhibit verbally. The genital exhibitionist is generally not a forceful person. Indeed he is regularly passive, easily frightened, and acts out his genital exhibiting when narcissistically re-injured, such as through rejection or loss of a love object. This genital exhibiting, while primarily restitutive or reparative in its psychological function, may express both fear and anger toward women, but the exhibiting is often secondarily masochistic: that is, the risk of discovery, arrest, and punishment is often imminent.

Without proper attention to the scopophilic-exhibitionistic conflicts, I believe that the psychoanalysis of almost any patient loses a vital dimension. There is, however, another way of stating what I am attempting to do in this monograph; that is, at the risk of the charge of simplism, one can take a particular perspective or vantage point and see what portion of mental events and derived behavior can be understood within it. Narcissism, libido, aggression, mental mechanisms of defense, phase-specific learning, object loss, and many other perspectives can be used to scrutinize the healthy and unhealthy elements of mental life in this way. Each set of such factors overlaps and contributes to the manifestations of overdetermination and multiple function inherent in our psychoanalytic theory. Admittedly the scopophilic-exhibitionistic perspective is a narrow one. I have tried to keep it narrow to test fully the discriminating power of its focus. Be that as it may, in my clinical explorations of this subject and in the writing of this book I have found many a delightful hour.

This monograph is divided into six parts. The first part sketches the historical background of scopophilia and exhibitionism in analysis, including personal experiences and characteristics of Freud that were touchstones in the development of a workable psychoanalytic technique. The second part of the monograph reviews the principal analytic formulations about scopophilia and exhibitionism and briefly introduces confirming suggestive findings from related sciences.

The third and fourth parts set out my own ideas about scopophilic-exhibitionistic factors, with relevant clinical data. I believe that the scopophilic-exhibitionistic elements, from their incipency, are vital in creativity and in normal adaptive functioning. Their inhibition and crippling are present in all neuroses. The illustrative clinical cases are

written with a scopophilic-exhibitionistic focus. However, these are not cases of overt perversion of scopophilia and exhibitionism. The patients present a wide range of clinical classifications. While each case presents clear threads of scopophilic-exhibitionistic conflict, each could have been described with equal validity using other points of view.

The fifth part of the monograph summarizes and integrates the previous material in regard to the implications of scopophilic-exhibitionistic factors for theory and technique in psychoanalysis. Correct management of scopophilic-exhibitionistic factors, I find, is crucial in dealing with resistances, in permitting ego-serving regression, and especially in resolving the transference neurosis. Scopophilic-exhibitionistic distortions, scopophobic elements, and inhibitions in the countertransference can impair the analyst's skill and contribute to those interminable analyses that "move" without movement.

"Scopophobic" is a word not in *Webster's* (1961), but it should have currency in connection with scopophilic-exhibitionistic problems. The word "scopophobia" is defined by Hinsie and Campbell (1960) as the fear of being looked *at*. Perhaps there is an inherent suggestion that "scopophobia" means also a fear of looking. Since both passive and active looking are implied in the word "scopophilia", I would propose that "scopophobia" be rescued from obscurity and be used to mean a fear of looking as well as a fear of being looked at.

The sixth part of the monograph points up the importance of scopophilic and exhibitionistic factors in creativity for science and art. From birth to death in any culture, by pervasive attitudes, by repeated examples, by streams of subliminal cues, we all are taught selective attention and selective inattention. We are taught what we *must* know, what we *may* investigate; and what we *must not* question, say, or show. If it is true that the art of being wise is the art of knowing what to overlook, it is equally true that creative genius is the capacity for seeing relationships where others see none. And it is often in observing the commonplace that such insight occurs.

The limited task that I have set myself is to focus on looking and showing—scopophilia and exhibitionism—in living.

# I The Role of Freud's Scopophilia-exhibitionism in the Development of Psychoanalysis

BESIDES the psychoanalyst and other behavioral scientists, many creative people are aware of the emotional impact made through scopophilic-exhibitionistic modalities. This group includes photographers, painters, sculptors, actors, politicians, and others in all areas of life. Joseph Conrad wrote: "My task which I am trying to achieve is, by the power of the written word to make you hear, to make you feel—it is, before all, to make you *see*. That—and no more, and it is everything" (Conrad, 1959, p. 14).

According to John Ruskin, "The greatest thing a human soul ever does in this world is to *see* something, and tell what it *saw* in a plain way. Hundreds of people can talk for one who can think, but thousands can think for one who can see. To see clearly is poetry, prophecy, and religion, all in one" (Bartlett, 1955, p. 605). Here, of course, Ruskin is using "see" in the full double meaning of seeing physically and seeing mentally, or comprehending.

For Goethe, "Thinking is more interesting than knowing, but less interesting than looking" (Flesch, 1957, p. 288).

E. M. Forster once related an anecdote that has considerable relevance to scopophilia-exhibitionism and to psychoanalysis. We smile with Forster because the old lady knew more than she knew and more than her more logical critics. "The old lady in the anecdote was accused by her nieces of being illogical. For some time she could not be brought to understand what logic was, and when she grasped its true nature she was not so much angry as contemptuous. 'Logic! Good gracious! What rubbish!' she exclaimed. 'How can I tell what I think till I see what I say?' " (Flesch, 1957, p. 288).

The importance of some of the looking-showing phenomena in the early history of psychoanalysis can be traced to the strong scopophilic-exhibitionistic cathexes in Freud's creative genius. Also, his being a Jew probably enhanced his psychological depth-perception by giving him the cultural binocularity of the inside outsider. Jones emphasizes, properly, the

themes of the interweaving of libido and aggression into a particularly stimulating and puzzling oedipal constellation (Jones, 1953, 1955, 1957).

Complex relationships and events of Freud's early life determined much of his character and penetrating curiosity, channeling his scopophilic impulses to searching out secrets. A brother rival for his young mother's love and milk appeared through birth and disappeared in death by the time Freud was 19 months old. At two-and-a-half years the appearance of a new rival, a sister, and the disappearance of his beloved old Nannie posed new and threatening puzzles. From teasing remarks by his adult half-brother Philipp, Freud developed the idea that his Nannie had been put in a chest; in fact, Philipp had put her in jail for stealing. Freud also thought that Philipp and Freud's mother had cooperated in producing the usurping sister. Then there was the highly ambivalent relationship with John who, though a year older, was, strangely, his nephew. And the *logical* pairing of his old father Jakob with old Nannie and of his half-brother Philipp with Freud's own young mother Amalie in Freud's mind confronted the awkward fact that it was Jakob not Philipp who slept with Amalie (Jones, 1953, p. 7).

The reader would do well to pause here to read the first chapter of Jones's biography of Freud. For my purposes I should like to point up a few of the factors which illustrate the early importance of the scopophilic-exhibitionistic axis of development for Freud and the cultural binocularity or inside outsider identity which I have mentioned and of which I shall have more to say later.

In the vicissitudes of psychosexual development, especially in the phallic period, the scopophilic-exhibitionistic component instincts enter into the ego attitudes of shame, embarrassment, pride, honor, and courage. Even if the personal origins of these cathexes in Freud are unknown, they were clearly present and integrated with his uses of intellectual aggression and his emotional sadomasochistic struggles with himself and others. One can see Freud's wish to exhibit himself and his powers, together with his wish to hide. He wished both to invite and to frustrate the scopophilia of others. Freud had painful misgivings about self-revelation. To Edward Bernays in 1929 he wrote:

That is of course quite an impossible suggestion. A biography is justified under two conditions. First, if the subject has had a share in important, generally interesting events; second, as a psychological study. Outwardly my life has passed calmly and uneventfully and can be covered by a few dates. A psychologically complete and honest confession of life, on the other hand, would require so much indiscretion (on my part as well as on that of others) about family, friends, and enemies, most of them still alive, that it is simply out of the question. What makes all autobiographies worthless is, after all, their mendacity.



Incidentally, it is American naïveté on the part of your publisher to expect a hitherto decent person to commit so base a deed for \$5,000. For me temptation might begin at a hundred times that sum, but even then it would be turned down after half an hour (Freud, E. L., 1960, p. 391).

Freud's basic sense of worth and power and his ambition are evident in his famous statement, "A man who has been the indisputable favorite of his mother keeps for life the feeling of a conqueror, that confidence of success that often induces real success" (Jones, 1953, p. 5). In Freiberg, where Freud was born, Protestants and Jews were small minorities in an almost wholly Catholic population. "A child would soon observe that his family did not belong to the majority and never attended the church, so that the chimes rang out not brotherly love but hostility to the little circle of non-believers" (p. 12). But Freud's Nannie implanted ideas of Heaven and Hell, and he went to church with her. The suggestion of partially taking in and identifying with what he saw there is strong in his imitative exhibitionistic reaction. After returning from church he would preach a sermon and expound God's doings (p. 6). His church viewing was not his only interested looking, however. An early memory "was of penetrating into his parents' bedroom out of (sexual) curiosity and being ordered out by an irate father" (p. 7). The association of urethral eroticism, cathexis of color, and the oedipal relationship is suggested in the following passage. "At the age of two he would still wet his bed and it was the father, not his indulgent mother, who reproved him. He recollected saying on one of these occasions: 'Don't worry, Papa. I will buy you a beautiful new red bed . . .'" (p. 7). Jones says that it was from such experiences that Freud developed the conviction that typically it was the father who represented to the son the principles of restraint, restriction, and authority, who stood for the reality principle while the mother stood for the pleasure principle. However, other inferences may be drawn. Little Sigmund hardly sounds intimidated by his father's authority. "Don't worry, Papa . . ." (p. 7) sounds conciliatory, comforting, and even a bit condescending to father Jakob. But, surely, there is an implication in the idea that the mother stands for the pleasure principle. If she did not, if she were severely prohibitive, the core reactions of the superego would be unrealistically harsh. I submit that the mother forms and the father merely tempers somewhat the basic superego.

At the age of three Freud was uprooted when the family moved to Leipzig. In what follows, note again the importance of the visual elements in the formation of memory traces and Freud's phobia.

He remembered the long ride in the horse-drawn vehicle and his first sight of a railway. . . .

On the way to Leipzig the train passed through Breslau, where Freud saw gas jets for the first time; they made him think of souls burning in hell! From this journey also dated the beginning of a "phobia" of traveling by train, from which he suffered a good deal for about a dozen years (1887-99), before he was able to dispel it by analysis. It turned out to be connected with the fear of losing his home (and ultimately his mother's breast)—a panic of starvation which must have been in its turn a reaction to some infantile greed. Traces of it remained in later life in the form of slightly undue anxiety about catching trains.

On the journey from Leipzig to Vienna, a year later, Freud had occasion to see his mother naked: an awesome fact which forty years later he related in a letter to Fliess—but in Latin! Curiously enough he gives his age then as between two and two and a half, whereas he was in fact four years old on that journey. One must surmise that the memories of two such experiences had got telescoped (Jones, 1953, p. 13).

Freud enjoyed being a great man, but was ambivalent about being the subject of biographic study. He chided Fritz Wittels in a letter about having confused some facts. "It just will not do to say: 'In my opinion you are a great man and a genius; as a result you have to allow yourself to be exposed in every way. I have flattered you so outrageously that I am entitled to your complete tolerance.' . . . You will have realized long ago that I am not pleased with the success of your book about me. But there it is, one is a 'great man,' therefore helpless" (Freud, E. L., 1960, p. 352). In the same letter Freud wrote, "A biographer should at least attempt to be as conscientious as a translator. *Traduttore = traditore* [Translator = traitor], says the proverb!" (p. 350).

Freud's awareness of the basic importance of scopophilic and exhibitionistic factors did not come only from his analysis of patients. Long before his self-analysis he was aware both of his wish to look and to know and of his intention to exhibit himself to the world in his own way and at a time of his own choosing. In a letter to his fiancée, Martha Bernays, in 1885, he wrote:

I have destroyed all my notes of the past fourteen years, as well as letters, scientific excerpts, and the manuscripts of my papers . . . all my thoughts and feelings about the world in general and about myself in particular have been found unworthy of further existence. . . . Everything, moreover, that lies beyond the great turning point in my life, beyond our love and my choice of profession, died long ago and must not be deprived of a worthy funeral. As for the biographers, let them worry, we have no desire to make it too easy for them. Each one of them will be right in his opinion of "The Development of the Hero", and I am already looking forward to seeing them go astray (Freud, E. L., 1960, pp. 140-1).

A defiant courage about truth is apparent throughout Freud's life, and it is this dedication to truth that caused him, however ambivalently, to use autobiographic showing of himself.

My worst qualities, among them a certain indifference to the world, probably had the same share in the final result as the good ones—i.e., a defiant courage about truth. In the depths of my heart I can't help being convinced that my dear fellow men, with a few exceptions, are worthless (Freud, E. L., 1960, p. 390).

Many incidents show Freud's defiant courage. Being both Viennese and a Jew, Freud probably benefited by being able to see things through the eyes of two cultures, or, rather, a culture within a culture. Similarly, anti-Semitism may have given him greater freedom, control, and direction for his aggressive impulses.

One of his memories of childhood was of his distress on hearing his father's story of being humiliated in a confrontation with an anti-Semite (Jones, 1953, p. 22). That memory and Freud's self-declared identification with the Semitic hero Hannibal, who sought to avenge his father Hamilcar (p. 23), indicate something of the fusion of the scopophilic-exhibitionistic factors with aggression and libido in the development of psychoanalysis. Freud's intellectual boldness was coupled with physical bravery, as revealed by his facing down the anti-Semites in a train in 1883:

You know how I am always longing for fresh air and always anxious to open windows, above all in trains. So I opened a window now and stuck my head out to get a breath of air. Whereupon there were shouts to shut it (it was the windy side), especially from one particular man. I declared my willingness to close the window provided another, opposite, were opened, it was the only open window in the whole long carriage. While the discussion ensued and the man said he was prepared to open the ventilation-slit instead of the window, there came a shout from the background: "He's a dirty Jew!"—And with this the whole situation took on a different color. My first opponent also turned anti-Semitic and declared: "We Christians consider other people, you'd better think less of your precious self," etc.; and muttering abuses befitting his education, my second opponent announced that he was going to climb over the seats to show me, etc. Even a year ago I would have been speechless with agitation, but now I am different; I was not in the least frightened of that mob, asked the one to keep to himself his empty phrases which inspired no respect in me, and the other to step up and take what was coming to him. I was quite prepared to kill him, but he did not step up; I was glad I refrained from joining in the abuse, something one must always leave to the others. With the compromise of ventilation-slit versus window, Act I came to an end. The conductor summoned by me took neither side but offered to escort me to another compartment, which I declined. Later, when several people opened the window in order to get out, and left it open, I settled down boldly beside it, for I felt very ready for a fight. The anti-Semite, this time with ironic politeness, renewed his request. No, said I, I'd do nothing of the kind, told him to turn to the conductor, and I held my own as far as the next station. There the conductor again refused to say